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Two experiments investigated children’s implicit and explicit differentiation between beliefs about
matters of fact and matters of opinion. In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds’ (n! 88) explicit understanding
of the subjectivity of opinions was found to be limited, but their conformity to others’ judgments on a
matter of opinion was considerably lower than their conformity to others’ views regarding an ambiguous
fact. In Experiment 2, children aged 6, 8, or 10 years (n! 81) were asked to make judgments either about
ambiguous matters of fact or about matters of opinion and then heard an opposing judgment from an
expert. All age groups conformed to the opposing judgments on factual matters more than they did to the
experts’ views on matters of opinion. However, only the oldest children explicitly recognized that
opinions are subjective and cannot be “wrong.” Implications of these results for models of children’s
reasoning about epistemic states are discussed.
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A great deal of research on children’s understanding of beliefs
has focused on children’s appreciation that they and others can
hold beliefs about the world that are false (e.g., Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001). However, several lines of research have addressed
differences among beliefs, showing that the understanding of false
belief, evaluated against an objective and external reality, does not
constitute the entirety of belief understanding. Specifically, beliefs
may often depend on internal, subjective experiences and prefer-
ences, as in the case of aesthetic judgments and personal taste, and
such beliefs cannot simply be judged as either correct or incorrect.
Existing research has suggested that whereas the diversity of
personal preferences is acknowledged early on, children’s under-
standing of the subjective nature of opinions continues to mature
into adolescence and possibly beyond. This study explores the
possibility that children’s explicit recognition of the subjectivity of
beliefs about matters of opinion appears later than, and is disso-
ciated from, an implicit distinction between facts and opinions in
their behavioral responses to the judgments of others.
It is important to note at the outset that the distinction between
matters of fact and matters of opinion is not necessarily clear-cut.
Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000) distinguished among several
judgment domains: personal taste, aesthetic judgment, value judg-
ment, truth about the physical world, and truth about the social
world. As these researchers have observed, people may identify
objective and subjective dimensions as relevant to each of these
domains. Disputes about complex matters concerning historical
events or even physical phenomena will undoubtedly be influ-
enced by subjective concerns, preferences, and reactions, and
people often form opinions about matters (e.g., political views,
attitudes toward a film) on the basis of objective, externally avail-
able information. Indeed, even within one domain, there are likely
to be variations in the balance between objective and subjective
dimensions. For example, some matters of taste may be entirely
dependent on subjective preferences, whereas beliefs about other
matters of taste (e.g., evaluative judgments about fine art or cui-
sine) may be heavily influenced by external criteria. In this study,
we focused on children’s ability to distinguish between relatively
simple matters of fact in which a single, decisive objective dimen-
sion is clearly salient (e.g., the length of a line, the age of a person)
and matters of taste and aesthetic preference in which elementary
school children are unlikely to see any obviously salient objective
dimension that points to a “right” or “wrong” answer.
Existing work has suggested that even young children may
recognize the legitimacy of differing opinions about matters of
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taste or aesthetic preference. In an investigation of children’s
theory of mind, Flavell, Flavell, Green, and Moses (1990) pro-
vided convincing evidence that 3-year-olds find it easier to at-
tribute nonnormative value beliefs (indications of personal prefer-
ence and opinion) to people than to attribute false beliefs about
factual matters to them. Moreover, children of this age are better
able to predict a person’s behavior on the basis of their stated value
beliefs than on the basis of their stated fact beliefs. This makes
sense in view of theory and empirical evidence that children’s
commonsense theory of mind may focus on individual differences
in desire (into which value beliefs can be easily translated) before
comprehending the notion of false belief (Wellman, 1990).
Work using other methodologies has also supported the notion
that young children have no difficulty with accepting differing
points of view regarding matters of taste. Carpendale and Chandler
(1996), for example, have pointed out that 5-year-olds can appre-
ciate the legitimacy of diverse personal preferences (e.g., regarding
taste), even though it is not until 7 years of age that children can
comprehend that two people can reasonably be predicted to have
different points of view regarding ambiguous facts (e.g., ambigu-
ous line figures, lexical ambiguity; see also Pillow & Henrichon,
1996). This dissociation led Carpendale and Chandler to suggest
that children’s early appreciation of the legitimacy of differing
personal tastes and preferences should not be seen as a psycho-
logical insight into the “interpretive nature of knowledge.”
Indeed, existing work has suggested that early support for the
legitimacy of diversity in opinion beliefs cannot be assumed to
reflect an understanding of the epistemic nature of these beliefs, as
distinct from that of beliefs about factual matters. Wainryb, Shaw,
Langley, Cottam, and Lewis (2004) assessed tolerance of differing
viewpoints on various matters (is it okay to have differing beliefs?)
and the degree of relativist thinking about these beliefs (are the
differing beliefs both right?). A majority of 5-year-olds held tol-
erant attitudes toward disagreements about matters of taste. How-
ever, analyses of children’s explanations for their judgments about
relativism showed that the distinction between statements of per-
sonal taste and beliefs about ambiguous facts increased with age:
At age 5 years, 56% of justifications appealed to the truth regard-
ing disagreements over ambiguous facts, but 47% of justifications
regarding taste did so, too—more than the 34% referring to sub-
jective preference. In contrast, by the age of 9 years, just 6% of
explanations regarding taste disputes referred to truth, with 94%
referring to subjective preference. Taken together with the evi-
dence of Carpendale and Chandler (1996), these findings strongly
suggested that although young children may be tolerant of differ-
ing statements about personal taste, this does not reflect an appre-
ciation of the subjective basis for (and hence validity of) those
beliefs.
The notion that it is toward the end of middle childhood that
children begin to acquire a genuinely relativist understanding of
personal preferences as founded on subjective preferences is con-
sistent with evidence from studies of lifespan epistemological
development. Kuhn et al. (2000) asked children and adults to judge
whether opposing beliefs in various judgment domains could both
be right (or have some “rightness”). Results suggested that rela-
tivist thinking regarding matters of opinion is evident in middle
childhood, with “the transition to the multiplist [relativist] level
most likely to appear first in personal taste and aesthetic judgment
domains and last in the truth domains” (p. 324). Wainryb et al.’s
(2004) findings, discussed above, suggest that this early emer-
gence of relativist accounts of beliefs about matters of personal
taste is itself likely to reflect a growing ability to reflect on the
importance of subjective preferences between 5 and 9 years of age.
Recent work by Rowley and Robinson (in press) has provided
further evidence for developmental change in and beyond middle
childhood with regard to the appreciation of subjectivity. The
authors focused on two key issues in judgments about diverse
beliefs regarding matters of ambiguous fact and matters of per-
sonal taste: references to internal factors (e.g., personal preference)
versus external factors (e.g., available information) when explain-
ing the legitimacy of differing viewpoints and the extent to which
truth can be discovered about the issue at hand (or used to resolve
the differences). Their two experiments showed developmental
progression in the understanding of subjectivity. The youngest
children tested (aged 6 years) failed to distinguish between differ-
ing beliefs about factual matters and differing beliefs about per-
sonal taste, with equal references to internal and external factors
when explaining diversity in both cases and equal affirmation that
truth could be found for both types of dispute. Slightly older
children (between 7 and 9 years of age) did refer to subjective
preference as a basis for diversity in personal taste more than for
diversity in factual beliefs but often still believed that the truth
could be found and that such truth is relevant to the resolution of
the dispute. Beyond middle childhood, at ages 11 and 13 years,
children were more likely to display a mature understanding of
disputes over personal taste as independent of external truth and
thus unresolvable.
All of this evidence seems to converge on a model of episte-
mological development whereby an early tolerance of diverse
statements reflecting personal taste matures between ages 5 and 11
years into a relativism about opinions that is based on an appre-
ciation of the subjective nature of such beliefs. Beliefs about
matters of opinion, then, come to be seen as distinct from beliefs
about facts, such that only the latter can be decisively tested
against objective reality. Crucially, however, these studies all rely
on explicit, metacognitive reflection on the nature and origin of
different types of belief. This leaves open the possibility that
children could demonstrate the distinction between factual beliefs
and opinions through their behavior, even though their explicit
reasoning may indicate a different, less advanced understanding.
There is good reason to suggest that children’s understanding of
distinctions among different types of beliefs may appear at an
implicit level before they show such knowledge in their explicit
reasoning. The notion that much of children’s knowledge at first is
present in an implicit, nonverbal, procedural format, before pro-
gressing to increasingly explicit levels, can help us make sense of
much of children’s cognitive development (see Dienes & Perner,
1999; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). In the context of solving arithmetic
problems, for example, Siegler and Stern (1998) have used micro-
genetic analyses to show that children often discover and use a
new, efficient strategy for problem solving before they are able to
report explicitly on this new strategy. Furthermore, research evi-
dence has already suggested that false belief understanding may
appear at an implicit level (e.g., as shown by correct eye gaze) in
advance of demonstrated explicit understanding (Clements & Per-
ner, 1994; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001). Im-
portantly, Dienes and Perner (1999) have suggested that at certain
periods of development, nondeclarative responses may rely on a
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“more accurate and developmentally advanced” (p. 748) knowl-
edge base that is dissociated from the less accurate and advanced
knowledge base that supports declarative responses.
We have already seen that young children of 5 years are typi-
cally tolerant of differing subjective judgments about many mat-
ters of opinion, and there is good evidence that children of this age
can conceive of desires as idiosyncratic and subjective (Yuill,
Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & van den Ende, 1996). Against this
background, it seems plausible that these children may have an
implicit recognition of the equal validity of differing subjective
judgments, despite explicitly overextending their belief in the
existence of objectively “correct” answers to matters of opinion.
At this point in development, then, children’s nondeclarative re-
sponses to judgments about facts and opinions may rely on rela-
tively advanced (but currently inaccessible) knowledge about the
nature of facts and opinions, whereas their declarative responses to
explicit questions about the epistemic status of differing factual
judgments and opinions would be supported by a (flawed) assump-
tion that, for example, a single “truth” can always be found (e.g.,
Rowley & Robinson, in press). Accordingly, the difficulties ex-
hibited by young children in the research discussed earlier may be
seen neither as a complete failure to appreciate the subjectivity of
opinions nor as some simple difficulty in verbally articulating what
is already understood. Rather, children may possess an explicit
conviction in the existence of the truth for all matters, regarding
both facts and opinions, that is dissociated from their implicit
knowledge of the distinction between facts and opinions.
If young children do indeed make an implicit distinction be-
tween beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion, then
how may we measure this in empirical work? It seems logical to
try to work backward from the explicit, declarative knowledge
involved in stating that two differing opinions are equally valid.
Specifically, we suggest that in order to infer an implicit, proce-
dural awareness of the distinction between facts and opinions
(which goes beyond establishing mere tolerance of differing opin-
ions), children would have to exhibit systematically different be-
havioral responses to matters of fact and opinion. In particular,
children must demonstrate their awareness that there is no single
right judgment of matters of opinion, rather than reporting on this
awareness explicitly. Interestingly, a 1979 study on children’s
comprehension of the “objectivity-subjectivity distinction” did ex-
actly that, although the two methodologies were not deliberately
contrasted in this way (Rothbaum, 1979).
In Rothbaum’s (1979) study, children between the ages of 7 and
14 years answered explicit questions about age (fact/objective) and
attractiveness (opinion/subjective) judgments, such as “Would one
of [two differing answers] have to be wrong?” However, they were
also required to make judgments themselves about the oldest and
best-looking face in sets of four photographs after seeing the
(purported) responses of their parents or of adult strangers. Results
showed that conformity to the adult responses was greater for age
judgments than for attractiveness judgments in the oldest children
but not in the younger children and that this developmental in-
crease in differentiation between objective and subjective judg-
ments was linked to the increase with age in explicit understanding
of the subjectivity of the attractiveness judgments. Rothbaum
argued that children begin to show different behavioral responses
to beliefs about facts and opinions (i.e., being influenced more by
the adults’ judgments about matters of fact than by their judgments
about matters of opinion) as a consequence of their rising com-
prehension of subjectivity.
Despite the apparent coherence of the two methodologies uti-
lized by Rothbaum (1979), we suggest that the conformity measure
should reveal implicit understanding of the fact–opinion distinc-
tion earlier than (rather than as a consequence of) the emergence of
correct explicit responses. In Rothbaum’s study, the conformity
task may have been unduly taxing for the younger children, with
each child having to make 72 age and attractiveness judgments
about the same kinds of photographs. Furthermore, providing
alleged responses of parents may not be the most appropriate
manipulation to elicit differentiated conformity responses. In the
two experiments presented here, we used smaller numbers of
carefully selected trials requiring children to respond to peer or
expert judgments about matters of fact or opinion.
Experiment 1
Our first experiment tested an adaptation of Rothbaum’s (1979)
procedure of asking explicit questions about objective and subjec-
tive judgments along with a measure of conformity to others’
responses. For assessing explicit awareness of the fact–opinion
distinction, we closely followed Rothbaum’s methodology, pre-
senting 8- to 9-year-olds with sets of photographs of similar-
looking faces and asking whether one of two differing answers to
a fact question and an opinion question (“Which one is the oldest?”
and “Which one is the nicest?” respectively) would have to be
wrong. We expected to replicate Rothbaum’s finding that most
children of this age are able to recognize that matters of fact can be
evaluated as right or wrong yet fail to recognize the subjective
nature of the attractiveness judgment.
For assessing implicit awareness of the distinction between
matters of fact and opinion, we departed from Rothbaum’s method
of requiring a series of age and attractiveness judgments from
children following presentation of parents’ (alleged) responses.
Instead, we used a simpler methodological paradigm from the
conformity literature whereby each participant’s judgments on a
series of tasks were sought following presentation of unanimous
choices by a group of (fictitious) peers. One line-matching task—
the “unambiguous fact” task—had one clearly correct answer,
whereas the correct answer to a second line-matching task—the
“ambiguous fact” task—was very difficult to determine. In line
with long-standing evidence from studies of conformity on line-
matching tasks (Hoving, Hamm, & Galvin, 1969; Walker & An-
drade, 1996), we expected much greater conformity to a unani-
mous but incorrect peer response on the ambiguous line-matching
task than on the unambiguous line-matching task. Critically, we
presented children with a third “opinion” task in which children
were asked to view a set of three houses and select the best house
in which to live, after first informing them of a unanimous choice
from peers. If 8- to 9-year-olds do have an implicit awareness of
the subjectivity of attractiveness judgments, they should be less
likely to conform to the peers on this task than on the ambiguous
fact task. Comparing their responses on the opinion task with their
level of independence on the unambiguous fact task enabled us to
assess the relative confidence of children in the validity of their
subjective judgments. It should be noted that the implicit tasks
were always presented before the explicit tasks, so that behavioral
responses to others’ judgments could be measured in the absence
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of any prior evaluation of whether answers to the questions could
be considered right or wrong.
Method
Participants. The sample consisted of 88 children aged 8–9
years (M! 8.79 years, SD! 0.56; 48 girls). Children were mostly
White and attended a school in an urban neighborhood.
Materials. Children were presented with five A4 sheets. Two
sheets had three reference lines and one target line that was the
same length as one of the three reference lines. In one of these
sheets, the three reference lines were clearly different in length,
and only one clearly matched the length of the target line. In the
other, the three reference lines were all of similar length and
difficult to tell apart. A third A4 sheet presented photographs of
three similarly sized and apparently well-maintained houses with
no obvious signs of damage or disrepair. Finally, one sheet pre-
sented three photographs of similar, youthful male faces, and a last
sheet presented three photographs of similar female faces. None of
the faces depicted on the last two sheets showed any obvious sign
of disfigurement or differences in aging, and all were smiling.
Design and Procedure. Children were seen individually by
one of four female or male experimenters in a quiet location in
their school. Each child was presented with three tasks designed to
tap an implicit understanding of the fact–opinion distinction: an
ambiguous fact task, an unambiguous fact task, and an opinion
task.1 In the ambiguous fact task, children saw a target line and
three reference lines of similar lengths, and the task was to select
which of the three reference lines was the same length as the target
line (“Which of these lines is the same length as that line?”
pointing to stimuli as appropriate). In the unambiguous fact task,
children also saw a target line and three reference lines, but two of
the reference lines were very clearly of different lengths to the
target line. In the opinion task, children saw pictures of three
houses and were asked, “Which of these three houses would be the
best house to live in?” Earlier work with a pilot sample had
confirmed that children did indeed all know the correct answer to
the unambiguous fact task and that children were evenly divided in
their spontaneous responses to the ambiguous fact and the opinion
tasks. For each implicit task, children were asked the question, but
before they marked their answer on a sheet of paper, they were
shown six pieces of paper alleged to be the responses of other
children who had completed the task. These six pieces of paper
unanimously listed an incorrect answer for both the ambiguous and
unambiguous fact tasks, and unanimously listed one of the houses
for the opinion task. Children were then asked to write down their
own answer. The precise wording used after the children were
asked the question about the stimuli was: “Just before you write it
down, I’ll show you what other children have written. [Show
responses one at a time]. Oh! They’ve all chosen X! All these
people have said X. You write down your answer now.” The order
of the three tasks was randomized.
Finally, children received two tasks designed to tap an explicit
understanding of the fact–opinion distinction. For each task, chil-
dren saw a set of three male or female faces and were told that they
were brothers or sisters. Children were told that the task was to
decide which person was the oldest (explicit fact) or which person
was the nicest (explicit opinion). They were asked to imagine that
they and a friend had chosen different faces, and they were then
asked whether one of these two answers would be wrong (“Say
that you picked this one and your friend picked that one. Would
one answer be wrong?”). The order of the two tasks was random-
ized.
Results
Explicit understanding. Preliminary analysis showed that no
significant effects of order were observed on the responses to the
explicit questions. The proportions of children claiming that there
would or would not be a wrong answer to the fact and opinion
questions are provided in Table 1. Excluding those children who
gave a “don’t know” response, a McNemar test demonstrated that
children were significantly more likely to say there was a wrong
answer for the fact question and not for the opinion question (20
out of 73, 27.4%) than vice versa (5 out of 73, 6.8%; p " .005).
However, binomial tests showed that whereas children indicated
that there was a wrong answer for the fact question at a level
greater than expected by chance ( p ! .001), they scored at chance
on the opinion question ( p # .5).
Implicit understanding. Preliminary analysis showed that no
significant effects of order were observed on the tendency to
conform to the fictional peer judgments. However, as predicted,
the proportions of conforming responses were significantly differ-
ent across the three tasks, Cohran’s Q(2) ! 41.84, p " .001.
Specifically, 24 of the 88 children (27.3%) conformed on the
unambiguous fact task and 27 of the 88 children (30.7%) con-
formed on the opinion task—both proportions slightly less than
would be expected simply by chance—but 63 out of the 88
children (69.3%) conformed on the ambiguous fact task, over
double the proportion that would be expected by chance. McNe-
mar tests confirmed this distinction between the ambiguous fact
task and the other two tasks ( ps" .001) and showed no significant
difference between the unambiguous fact task and opinion task
( p # .5).
A final analysis demonstrated that there was no significant
association between the explicit understanding of subjectivity and
the amount of conformity displayed on the attractiveness task.
Seventy-five percent of children who showed an explicit under-
standing that matters of opinion have no wrong answers did not
conform to the unanimous choice regarding the best house in
which to live, but this was also true for the majority of children
who thought that matters of opinion do have a wrong answer (65%
did not conform) or simply did not know (64% did not conform),
$2(2, N ! 88) ! 1.12, ns. Furthermore, a direct comparison
between the implicit and explicit measures of understanding sub-
jectivity (excluding children who said they did not know in re-
sponse to the latter) showed that significantly more children stated
explicitly that there would be a wrong answer to a subjective
question, yet still did not conform to the unanimous response
regarding the best house in which to live (31.2%), than did the
opposite pattern (13%), indicating that implicit awareness of sub-
jectivity is significantly more apparent in this age group than is
explicit awareness (McNemar test, p " .05).
1 Children were presented with several other tasks using different meth-
odologies for pilot research addressing separate research questions not
addressed here.
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Discussion
The results regarding our explicit questions about the subjectiv-
ity of attractiveness judgments and the objectivity of age judg-
ments suggest that 8- to 9-year-olds can acknowledge the objective
nature of factual beliefs but often fail to recognize the distinctively
subjective nature of value beliefs. The majority of the children
recognized that questions about matters of fact can be judged as
right or wrong but were equally divided (responding at chance
level) about whether the same can be said for matters of opinion.
This pattern of results is consistent with Rothbaum’s (1979) find-
ings.
However, the children’s responses on the conformity tasks
clearly reflected a distinction between the ambiguous fact task and
the attractiveness task, with much greater conformity to peer
responses on the former than on the latter. In fact, children ap-
peared to be as confident in the validity of their independent,
subjective judgments about attractiveness as they were about the
evidence of their own eyes in the unambiguous line-matching task,
with less than a third of children conforming in each case. In fact,
this confidence in subjective judgments might be even more pro-
nounced because a proportion of those who did conform on the
attractiveness task may have selected their response purely on the
basis of their own subjective preference (without any influence by
the unanimous peer choice).
This finding contributes to a complex portrait of 8- to 9-year-
olds’ understanding of the distinction between matters of fact and
opinion. On the one hand, the subjectivity of attractiveness judg-
ments was not universally appreciated by the children, with an
even split between those saying that one of two different answers
would be wrong and those saying that it need not be wrong. On the
other hand, the children as a group showed a clear distinction in
patterns of conformity on judgments about matters of opinion
(attractiveness of house) and ambiguous matters of fact (line
matching), with more than double the proportion conforming to
peer judgments on the latter than on the former. Thus, the children
clearly were far more influenced by others’ responses on the
ambiguous fact task than on the attractiveness task. Extending
Chandler, Boyes, and Ball’s (1990) developmental analysis of
young persons’ “working distinctions” between facts and opinions,
these findings suggest that 8- to 9-year-olds turn to the unanimous
majority view as an important, external guide to objective reality
when confronted with ambiguous facts but are confident in their
own internal preferences as sufficient justification for beliefs about
matters of opinion.
Moreover, regardless of responses to the explicit task, a clear
majority of children did not conform to the peer judgment on the
attractiveness task. Thus, explicit comprehension of subjectivity
was not a prerequisite for greater conformity on objective than on
subjective judgments. Using Rothbaum’s (1979) methodological
approaches to children’s epistemological understanding—
measuring conformity to others’ judgments about objective and
subjective questions as well as responses to explicit questions—
but with different stimuli and simpler procedures, we found evi-
dence that an implicit distinction between objective and subjective
matters could be exhibited in children’s behavior even when they
do not make such a distinction in their explicit responses.
It is important to stress that this study included only a limited
range of stimuli, which varied between explicit and implicit tasks
and between fact and opinion versions of the implicit task. In
addition, the nature of the implicit measure was such that genuine
personal preferences could potentially be conflated with confor-
mity to the peer judgment, making it difficult to assess the precise
extent to which individual differences in implicit differentiation
were independent of variability in explicit responses. Our next
study sought to address these limitations and add more detail to our
understanding of children’s differentiation between facts and opin-
ions.
Experiment 2
The results from our first experiment fill in some of the detail
missing in our understanding of the transition from an absolutist
model of epistemology, where all beliefs may be classed as right
or wrong, to a multiplist conceptualization of matters of opinions.
Our sample’s responses to others’ judgments about matters of fact
and opinion suggested that 8- to 9-year-olds are beginning to
appreciate the subjectivity of the aesthetic domain while maintain-
ing a clear focus on external sources of information when evalu-
ating factual matters. This extends Kuhn et al.’s (2000) finding that
only a minority of the 7- to 8-year-olds they interviewed showed
such domain-specific multiplism.
Our suggestion that limitations in the explicit understanding of
the fact–opinion distinction may mask clear differentiation in
behavioral responses to others’ judgments about matters of fact
and opinion clearly needs the support of a developmental analysis.
In this second experiment, we assessed the implicit and explicit
understanding of the fact–opinion distinction in three groups aged
6, 8, and 10 years. We anticipated that children’s behavioral
responses to others’ judgments would be similarly distinguished
along the fact–opinion divide in all age groups, even though the
same children’s explicit understanding of subjectivity was ex-
pected to increase with age.
In addition to including three age groups, we made several
methodological changes in this study in order to address limita-
tions in the first experiment. First, rather than relying on single
trials for fact and opinion domains, Experiment 2 involved four
ambiguous fact tasks and four opinion tasks. It should be noted that
the unambiguous line-matching task in Experiment 1 had served
its purpose as a reference task for evaluating children’s conformity
responses on the ambiguous fact and opinion tasks, and therefore
no further unambiguous tasks were designed for this study. Sec-
ond, in order to avoid confounding the type of stimuli with the
domain of belief (fact and opinion) or with the form of knowledge
Table 1
Number and Percentage of Children Indicating That One of
Two Different Answers to a Question Would or Would Not Be
Wrong, by Question Type (Experiment 1)
Question
type
Would not be
a wrong
answer
Would be a
wrong answer Don’t know
n % n % n %
Fact 24 27.3 54 61.4 10 11.4
Opinion 40 45.5 37 42.0 11 12.5
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being assessed (explicit and implicit), we used four sets of photo-
graphs of everyday objects (houses, toys, dogs, and cakes) about
which we sought judgments on questions of both fact and opinion,
and with reference to which we asked our explicit questions about
the existence of a wrong answer. This addressed an important
limitation in Experiment 1, where the explicit and implicit tasks
involved different stimulus sets. In this experiment, we sought to
obtain information about children’s explicit and implicit under-
standing of the fact–opinion distinction in the same four contexts.
Third, in order to provide a stricter test of children’s indepen-
dence on subjective judgments and to avoid any possibility of
conflating chance responding with social influence, we adopted a
three-stage approach to the implicit measure and used expert
judgments in place of peer responses. We first obtained children’s
judgments, then presented a discrepant judgment from an expert in
the matter at hand (e.g., a veterinarian’s judgments on questions
relating to dogs), and then gave the children a chance to change or
maintain their response. Existing research has documented the
attention paid by children in middle childhood to knowledge,
social context, and social-organizational position as the basis for
the legitimacy of directives (Damon, 1977; Laupa, 1991; Laupa &
Turiel, 1986, 1993), and the judgments of people with context-
specific social positions and expertise can therefore be assumed to
be a particularly powerful source of influence. Maintaining a
subjective attitude in the face of an expert’s discrepant opinion,
while conforming to the expert’s view on factual matters, would
provide particularly strong evidence for the children’s distinction
between the two domains of judgment. Finally, we obtained de-
tailed quantitative and qualitative responses from children regard-
ing their confidence in, and reasons for, their judgments.
On the basis of the hypothesis that implicit understanding of the
fact–opinion distinction is present in all the age groups, we ex-
pected children to be more likely to change their selection follow-
ing the expert judgment on fact questions than on opinion ques-
tions and accordingly to offer qualitatively different accounts of
their behavior in response to fact and opinion questions (e.g.,
referring more to expert judgments on matters of fact and more to
the stimuli themselves on matters of opinion). Furthermore, if
children were observed to change their response on fact judgments
following expert judgments, we expected them to be more confi-
dent in their new, informed answers, in comparison to their old,
uninformed answers. In contrast to these measures, however, ex-
plicit references to the epistemic nature of objective and subjective
beliefs—such as statements about the validity of subjective judg-
ments on matters of opinion—were predicted to increase in fre-
quency with rising age, similar to the performance on the explicit
questions about the existence of wrong answers.
Method
Participants. The sample consisted of 27 children aged 6 years
(M ! 6.26 years, SD ! 0.27; 15 girls), 26 children aged 8 years
(M ! 8.21 years, SD ! 0.27; 15 girls), and 28 children aged 10
years (M ! 10.29 years, SD ! 0.29; 11 girls). Children were
mostly White and attended a school in an urban neighborhood.
Materials. Children were presented with four laminated A4
sheets, each with three photographs labeled A, B, or C. One set of
photographs showed three children’s toys, a second showed three
houses, a third showed three dogs, and the last showed three
desserts (portions of cake). The three items in each photograph
varied in color, shape, and featural details, but they were all
similarly sized, bright, and colorful, and there were no cues point-
ing to obviously negative qualities (e.g., none of the houses
showed any sign of disrepair, all of the desserts appeared to be
presented as they might be served in a restaurant).
Design and Procedure. Children were seen individually by a
female experimenter in a quiet location in their school. Each child
was presented with eight tasks, with a “fact” task and an “opinion”
task for each of the four sets of photographs described above. For
each task, children were first asked to make a judgment about the
matter of fact or opinion at hand (e.g., “Which dessert takes the
longest to bake?” or “Which dessert is the most tasty?”). They then
rated their confidence in their answer on a 4-point scale (from not
sure at all to very sure). They were then told the answer allegedly
given by an expert (e.g., a baker who spends a lot of time making
different desserts). This answer was different from the child’s own
response for three of the fact and three of the opinion tasks; for the
two remaining “filler” tasks, the expert’s judgment matched the
child’s judgment. Children were reminded of their original re-
sponse and asked if they wanted to change their answer. They then
rated their confidence in their final answer. They were asked to
justify why their response changed or stayed the same. Finally, to
assess explicit understanding of the fact–opinion distinction, chil-
dren were asked to imagine that two hypothetical characters gave
opposing responses to the question and were then asked whether
one of those characters would have to be wrong. They were also
asked to justify their answer to this question. The eight tasks were
presented in a random order, except that one fact “filler” task and
one opinion “filler” task (where the experts’ judgments matched
the child’s own response) were always presented in the third and
sixth position. The experts’ choices and the two hypothetical
characters’ choices were selected randomly. Tasks and questions
are listed in the Appendix.
Scoring
Children’s confidence ratings always ranged from 0 (not at all
sure) to 3 (very sure). Children received a mean initial confidence
rating across the four fact questions and a mean initial confidence
rating across the four opinion questions. They also received
“change” scores indicating the number of times they changed their
initial response after hearing the expert judgment. This was cal-
culated once for the fact questions for which the expert gave a
different response to the child, and once for the opinion questions
for which the expert gave a different response to the child; both
scores could range from 0 to 3. Children also received four
“confidence difference” scores indicating the mean difference in
confidence from before to after hearing the discrepant expert
judgment. This mean difference was calculated for fact questions
for which the child had changed the response following the dis-
crepant expert judgment, for fact questions for which the child did
not change the response, for opinion questions for which the child
changed the response, and for opinion questions for which the
child did not change the response. These confidence change scores
could range from –3 to % 3, with positive scores indicating lower
confidence in the second answer and negative scores indicating
greater confidence in the second answer.
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Children’s justifications for why their response changed or
stayed the same were coded into the following four categories: (a)
reference to some aspect of the stimuli (e.g., “Because that dog
looks like it’s smiling,” “That house just looks nicer”); (b) direct
or indirect reference to the expert’s judgment (e.g., “She works
with dogs so she’d know more than me,” “I changed because I
wanted to get it right”); (c) reference to validity of different
opinions (e.g., “People like different things,” “It’s just my opin-
ion,” “You don’t have to follow what the expert says”); and (4)
residual responses, including “don’t know.” Twenty percent of the
children’s justifications were scored by another rater blind to the
age of the children, and interrater agreement was high (97%, & !
.95). Children received scores for the number of times each type of
justification was used across the three fact questions and the three
opinion questions where the expert gave a discrepant response.
For the final item tapping explicit understanding of the fact–
opinion distinction, we calculated the number of fact questions and
number of opinion questions (both out of four) for which children
said one of two different responses would have to be wrong.
Children’s justifications were coded into one of six categories: (a)
reference to the earlier expert’s judgment (e.g., “One would have
to be wrong because Peter said C”); (b) statement of own judgment
(e.g., “One would have to be wrong because that cake looks
gross”); (c) suggestion that there is no wrong answer because the
stimuli are the same (e.g., “They both look friendly,” “They could
be the same age”); (d) suggestion that there is a wrong answer
because the stimuli are different (e.g., “They couldn’t both be the
tastiest,” “They can’t be the same age”); (e) reference to validity of
different opinions (e.g., “It’s OK to like different things,” “It’s just
their opinion”); and (f) residual responses, including “don’t
know.” Twenty percent of the children’s justifications were scored
by another rater blind to the age of the children, and interrater
agreement was again high (96%, & ! .95). Children received
scores for the number of times each type of justification was used
across the four fact questions and the four opinion questions.
Results
Preliminary analysis on the children’s first response to each
question showed that there was never a unanimous consensus on
the answer to any of the questions. Each response choice was
always selected by at least some children, and the proportions
selecting the modal response choice ranged between .37 and .70
across the opinion questions and between .40 and .59 across the
fact questions. However, across the four stimuli sets, the modal
response was selected by children more often for the opinion
questions than for the fact questions: means out of four (SDs) !
2.44 (0.92) versus 2.05 (1.02), respectively; t(80) ! 2.66, p ! .01.
In addition, we tested for differences among the fact questions and
among the opinion questions, both on the implicit measure
(changes to conform to the experts’ judgments) and on the explicit
question (would one of the answers have to be wrong?). No
significant differences between responses to the different stimuli
sets were found, either for the fact questions or for the opinion
questions.
Initial confidence ratings. A mixed-design analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) was conducted on the initial confidence ratings,
with question type (fact vs. opinion) within subjects and age group
(6, 8, and 10 years) between subjects. Partial eta-squared is re-
ported as a measure of effect size for this and all following
ANOVA tests. The analysis revealed a main effect of question
type, F(1, 78) ! 51.90, p " .001, '2 ! .40, with confidence for
fact questions lower than confidence for opinion questions: Ms
(SDs) ! 1.95 (0.58) and 2.39 (0.49), respectively. There was also
a significant main effect of age group, F(2, 78) ! 8.65, p " .001,
'2 ! .18, with confidence higher in the youngest age group than
in the middle and oldest age groups: Ms (SDs) ! 2.45 (0.44), 2.01
(0.46), and 2.06 (0.37), respectively. There was no significant
interaction between the two variables (F " 1).
Changes in response. A mixed-design analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) was conducted on the number of times children
changed response after hearing the discrepant expert judgment,
with question type within subjects and age group between subjects.
The initial confidence ratings for the fact and opinion questions,
and the numbers of times the modal response was selected for the
fact and opinion questions, were entered as covariates. The inclu-
sion of these covariates serves to ensure that any observed effect of
question type could not be attributed to the initial level of certainty
regarding, or ambiguity of, the opinion and fact tasks.2 Even after
controlling for these covariates, the analysis revealed a significant
main effect of question type, F(1, 74) ! 6.56, p ! .01, '2 ! .08.
There was also a main effect of age group, F(2, 74) ! 3.85, p "
.05, '2 ! .09, reflecting a general tendency for children to change
their response less with age. Importantly, however, there was no
significant interaction between question type and age group (F "
1). Figure 1 shows that children in each age group were more
likely to change their response following a discrepant expert
judgment for fact questions than for opinion questions.
Interestingly, there was also an interaction between question
type and the covariate concerning initial confidence in the fact
questions, F(1, 74) ! 4.39, p " .05, '2 ! .06. Further analysis
showed that initial confidence in the fact questions was negatively
related to the number of changes to conform to the experts’ factual
judgments, r(81) ! (.34, p " .005. On the other hand, no such
pattern was evident for the initial confidence in the opinion ques-
tions: Confidence in these instances was unrelated to the level of
conformity to the experts’ opinions (r " .10).
Difference in confidence ratings. We examined four confi-
dence difference scores: for fact questions for which the child
changed the response, for fact questions for which the child did not
change the response, for opinion questions for which the child
changed the response, and for opinion questions for which the
child did not change the response. The number of valid data points
for each of these four scores varied depending on the number of
children who changed or did not change their responses following
the discrepant expert judgments: 60 children changed their re-
sponse on at least one fact question, 34 changed their response on
at least one opinion question, 62 showed no change on at least one
fact question, and 78 showed no change on at least one opinion
2 An ANCOVA controlling for the differences between the fact and
opinion covariates (i.e., the difference between the initial confidence rat-
ings for the fact and opinion questions, and the difference between the
number of times the modal response was selected for the fact and opinion
questions) revealed the same pattern: a significant main effect of question
type, F(1, 76) ! 19.13, p " .001, '2 ! .20, and no interaction with age
group, F " 1.
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question. A one-sample t test was carried out on each of the
confidence difference scores to determine whether any significant
increase or decrease in confidence was apparent. No significant
changes in confidence were found among those who maintained
their initial answer in the face of the discrepant expert judgment:
mean confidence difference scores (SDs) ! 0.11 (0.59) and 0.11
(0.50) for fact and opinion questions, respectively; ts " 1.89, ps #
.05.
As predicted, children who changed their response on one or
more fact questions were significantly more confident in their
second, informed answers than in their first, uninformed answers:
mean confidence difference score (SD) ! (0.54 (0.97), t(59) !
4.30, p " .001. Interestingly, the minority who did change their
response following the expert judgment on one or more opinion
questions did not show this significant improvement in confidence
for their new opinions: mean confidence difference score (SD) !
(0.11 (0.89), t " 1. Only 28 children changed response at least
once on both fact and opinion questions, but a mixed-design
ANOVA on these children’s confidence difference scores, with
question type within subjects and age group between subjects,
confirms that they became more confident in their new answer
only for fact questions: mean confidence difference scores
(SDs) ! (0.65 (0.85) for fact questions and (0.10 (0.93) for
opinion questions; main effect of question type, F(1, 25) ! 6.86,
p " .05, '2 ! .22. There was no significant interaction between
question type and age group (F " 1.2).
Justifications for change/no change in response. Table 2 pro-
vides the mean number of each type of justification provided by
each age group for changing or maintaining their responses to fact
and opinion questions. For justifications referring to an aspect of
the stimuli, a mixed-design ANOVA with question type within
subjects and age group between subjects revealed only a signifi-
cant main effect of question type, F(1, 78) ! 29.08, p " .001,
'2 ! .27, with these justifications offered more for opinion ques-
tions than for fact questions. For justifications referring to the
expert’s judgments, the ANOVA showed a significant main effect
of question type, F(1, 78) ! 34.66, p " .001, '2 ! .31, with more
of these justifications for fact questions than for opinion questions.
Only the oldest age group gave a small number of justifications
referring to the validity of different opinions, and they tended to do
so more for opinion questions than for fact questions, t(27)! 1.88,
p " .08. Finally, an ANOVA on the number of residual justifica-
tions given showed only a tendency for such justifications to
decrease with age, F(2, 78) ! 3.59, p " .05, '2 ! .08.
Explicit understanding. The mean numbers of fact and opinion
questions for which the child believed one of two different answers
must be wrong are presented in Figure 2, subdivided by age group.
A mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on these scores, with
question type within subjects and age group between subjects. This
revealed a main effect of question type, F(1, 76) ! 34.08, p "
.001, '2 ! .31, and a main effect of age group, F(2, 76) ! 6.69,
p" .005, '2 ! .15. The belief that one answer must be wrong was
generally higher for fact questions than for opinion questions and
was generally higher in the youngest age group. However, these
effects are qualified by a significant interaction of question type
and age group, F(2, 76)! 7.79, p! .001, '2! .17. Simple effects
analysis confirmed that the simple effect of question type was not
significant for the youngest age group, F(1, 76)! 2.31, ns, but was
significant for the middle and older age groups, F(1, 76) ! 4.40,
p " .05, and F(1, 76) ! 44.01, p " .001, respectively. We next
conducted one-sample t tests to compare the number of questions
for which the child believes one answer must be wrong with the
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Figure 1. Mean number of questions for which the answer was changed after hearing the expert judgment, by
question type and age group (Experiment 2).
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chance value (2). These showed that the youngest group was
significantly above chance for both fact and opinion questions,
ts # 2.64, ps " .05; the middle group was at chance for both fact
and opinion questions, ts" 1.5, ns; and the oldest group was above
chance for fact questions, t(26)! 2.95, p" .01, and below chance
for opinion questions, t(27) ! 4.25, p " .001.
We next evaluated the extent to which the above findings
regarding the explicit and implicit measures were associated with
each other. The tendency to respond explicitly that questions had
wrong answers was modestly associated with the tendency to
conform to experts’ judgments, but this was true both within and
across fact and opinion domains (rs between .12 and .31, no
significant differences among correlations). It should be stressed,
however, that the critical main effect of question type (fact vs.
opinion) on the number of conforming responses remained signif-
icant after controlling for the explicit judgments, F(1, 74)! 10.31,
p " .005, '2 ! .12, with no significant interaction with age group
(F" 1). Similarly, the important interaction between question type
and age group in explaining explicit judgments about fact and
opinion tasks remained significant even after controlling for the
number of times children conformed to the experts’ judgments on
fact and opinion tasks, F(2, 74) ! 6.90, p " .005, '2! .16. Thus,
the key patterns regarding implicit and explicit understanding of
the distinction between facts and opinions appear to be indepen-
dent of each other. Indeed, there was some evidence of a double
dissociation in the implicit and explicit understanding of the sub-
Table 2
Mean (SD) Number of Each Type of Justification Provided by Each Age Group for Changing or Maintaining Their Initial Response,
by Question Type (Experiment 2)
Age group
Stimuli Expert Validity of opin. Residual
Fact Opinion Fact Opinion Fact Opinion Fact Opinion
6 years 1.67
(1.18)
2.07
(1.27)
0.48
(0.94)
0.15
(0.36)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.85
(1.17)
0.78
(1.09)
8 years 1.69
(0.93)
2.42
(0.81)
0.81
(0.94)
0.12
(0.33)
0.00
(0.00)
0.08
(0.27)
0.50
(0.81)
0.38
(0.64)
10 years 1.57
(1.14)
2.14
(0.93)
0.82
(1.06)
0.11
(0.32)
0.21
(0.69)
0.54
(0.79)
0.39
(0.63)
0.21
(0.42)
Total 1.64
(1.08)
2.21
(1.02)
0.70
(0.98)
0.12
(0.33)
0.07
(0.41)
0.21
(0.54)
0.58
(0.91)
0.46
(0.79)
Note. Stimuli ! reference to some aspect of the stimuli; Expert ! direct or indirect reference to the expert’s judgment; Validity of opin. ! reference to
validity of different opinions; Residual ! residual responses, including “don’t know.”
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Figure 2. Mean number of questions for which children believed one of two different answers must be wrong,
by question type and age group (Experiment 2).
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jectivity of opinions: 27 children never conformed to opinion
judgments despite claiming explicitly that there was a wrong
answer on at least one of the four opinion questions, and 11
children conformed at least once even though they always main-
tained explicitly that there was no wrong answer on the opinion
questions.
Finally, we found again that the explicit awareness of the
subjectivity of opinions was in general less evident in this age
range than the implicit, procedural awareness. The proportion of
responses in which children maintained independence in the face
of discrepant expert opinions was significantly higher than the
proportion of responses in which children believed that there was
no wrong answer to questions about matters of opinion, Ms
(SDs) ! 0.81 (0.26) versus 0.56 (0.41), respectively; t(80) ! 5.40,
p " .001.
Justifications for belief that one answer must/need not be wrong.
Table 3 records the mean number of each type of justification
provided by each age group for the fact questions and for the
opinion questions. For each type of justification, a mixed-design
ANOVA was conducted with question type within subjects and
age group between subjects. For justifications referring to the
expert judgment as a statement of fact, there was a main effect of
question type, F(1, 78) ! 7.43, p " .01, '2 ! .09, with more such
justifications given for fact than for opinion questions. It should be
noted that although there was no significant interaction with age
group ( p # .10), the mean scores clearly showed that the question
type effect appeared in the middle and older age groups only. For
justifications referring to one’s own judgment as a statement of
fact, there was only a significant main effect of age group, F(2,
78)! 8.38, p! .001, '2! .18, with such justifications decreasing
with age. For justifications suggesting that there is no wrong
answer because the stimuli are the same, there were no significant
effects.
For justifications suggesting that there is a wrong answer be-
cause the stimuli are different, there were significant main effects
of question type, F(1, 78) ! 18.52, p " .001, '2 ! .19, and age
group, F(2, 78) ! 6.97, p " .005, '2 ! .15, but these were
qualified by an interaction between question type and age group,
F(2, 78) ! 11.48, p " .001, '2 ! .23. Only the oldest children
showed a significant simple effect of question type, F(1, 78) !
9.33, p " .001, giving more such justifications for fact questions
than for opinion questions. Similarly, for justifications referring to
the validity of different opinions, there were significant main
effects of question type, F(1, 78)! 53.59, p" .001, '2 ! .41, and
age group, F(2, 78) ! 11.75, p " .001, '2 ! .23, but these were
qualified by an interaction between question type and age group,
F(2, 78) ! 17.43, p " .001, '2 ! .31. Only the middle and oldest
age group showed significant simple effects of question type, F(1,
78) ! 24.07, p " .001, and F(1, 78) ! 54.07, p " .001, respec-
tively, giving more such justifications for opinion questions than
for fact questions. Finally, there was a main effect of age group on
residual justifications, F(2, 78) ! 3.06, p ! .05, '2 ! .07, with
such justifications declining with age.
Discussion
This experiment provides further evidence for the claims made
earlier, namely, that children from a young age display an implicit
awareness of the distinction between matters of fact and opinion,
but that the explicit recognition of the subjectivity of judgments
about matters of opinion rises with age. Even when faced with the
discrepant view of an expert in the matter at hand, children as
young as 6 years of age were considerably less likely to change
their response on questions about matters of opinion in comparison
with questions about matters of fact. Importantly, this effect was
significant even after controlling for the initial ratings of confi-
dence in the initial answers given, as well as the overall levels of
ambiguity across the fact and across the opinion tasks (as indicated
by the number of times children selected the modal response).
Interestingly, follow-up analysis showed that children did not
turn to experts’ judgments for guidance even when they felt unsure
about their own answers to questions about opinions: No associ-
ation between confidence and conformity was found for these
questions. On the other hand, children did use experts’ judgments
as a valuable informational source on judgments about factual
matters, especially when they felt uncertain about their responses.
Table 3
Mean (SD) Number of Each Type of Justification Provided by Each Age Group for Why One of Two Answers Must or Need Not Be
Wrong, by Question Type (Experiment 2)
Age group
Expert judgment Own judgment
Stimuli are the
same
Stimuli are
different
Validity of
opinions Residual
Fact Opinion Fact Opinion Fact Opinion Fact Opinion Fact Opinion Fact Opinion
6 years 0.44
(0.80)
0.44
(0.80)
1.15
(1.06)
1.04
(1.06)
0.44
(0.89)
0.37
(0.74)
0.19
(0.48)
0.26
(0.59)
0.00
(0.00)
0.15
(0.60)
0.78
(1.09)
0.74
(1.10)
8 years 0.35
(0.80)
0.08
(0.27)
0.46
(0.90)
0.62
(0.94)
0.54
(0.76)
0.46
(0.71)
0.62
(0.90)
0.31
(0.55)
0.42
(0.90)
0.96
(1.15)
0.62
(0.90)
0.58
(0.81)
10 years 0.57
(1.07)
0.14
(0.45)
0.18
(0.48)
0.32
(0.72)
0.39
(0.69)
0.25
(0.59)
1.36
(1.16)
0.25
(0.52)
0.21
(0.63)
1.79
(1.23)
0.25
(0.52)
0.25
(0.52)
Total 0.46
(0.90)
0.22
(0.57)
0.59
(0.93)
0.65
(0.95)
0.46
(0.78)
0.36
(0.68)
0.73
(1.01)
0.27
(0.55)
0.21
(0.65)
0.98
(1.22)
0.54
(0.88)
0.52
(0.85)
Note. Expert judgment ! reference to the earlier expert’s judgment; Own judgment ! statement of own judgment; Stimuli are the same ! suggestion
that there is no wrong answer because the stimuli are the same; Stimuli are different ! suggestion that there is a wrong answer because the stimuli are
different; Validity of opinions ! reference to validity of different opinions; Residual ! residual responses, including “don’t know.”
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Correspondingly, when children did change their response on fact
questions after receiving expert guidance, they felt significantly
more confident in their new answer than they did in their first,
uninformed answer. In contrast, the minority of children who did
change responses on one or more opinion questions did not feel
any more confident in their new opinion than in their initial one. It
is important to acknowledge, however, that we used only a selec-
tion of judgment tasks and only fictional experts who could be
assumed to have domain-specific knowledge about the stimuli.
Thus, future research may fruitfully examine whether the differ-
ences in behavioral responses to experts, and associated confi-
dence ratings, depend on the domain of judgment and on the
identity and status of the expert. For example, perceptions of
parents, teachers, and friends as epistemic authorities are known to
vary across domains (e.g., good pastimes, friendship choices,
science, etc.) and developmentally during childhood and adoles-
cence (Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Houminer, 1990; Bar-Tal, Raviv,
Raviv, & Brosh, 1991). The extent to which these patterns are
mirrored in children’s behavioral responses to authority figures on
different types of judgment matters (e.g., value judgments, per-
suasive arguments) is an important question for future research.
Nonetheless, the present data provide clear indications that
children from a young age are certainly capable of distinguishing
between the types of fact and opinion judgments presented to them
here. Even those in the youngest age group were more likely to
adhere to their opinions, compared with their factual beliefs, in the
face of opposing experts’ judgments. Yet, these children failed to
comment explicitly on the subjectivity of opinions, suggesting that
the epistemological knowledge demonstrated in their behavior was
held at an implicit or procedural level. On the other hand, the
children did in general justify their behavior on fact and opinion
tasks in different ways, referring to aspects of the stimuli more for
questions of opinion and referring to the expert’s judgment more
for questions of fact. This raises the intriguing possibility that
children’s procedural distinction between beliefs about facts and
opinions is accompanied— or even explained— by particular
forms of explicit epistemological reasoning, such as knowing who
is the best authority on matters of fact and opinion. However,
recent research has pointed to a developmental increase in explicit
awareness of the self as the best authority on matters of opinion
(Bar-Tal et al., 1991; Burton & Mitchell, 2003). This is consistent
with our own data on the explicit task and with our observation
that only the oldest children explicitly commented on the validity
of their own opinions. Thus, the general tendencies to refer to the
expert more on the fact tasks and to the stimuli more on the
opinion tasks could simply reflect children’s identification of the
particular task features corresponding to their behavior; the justi-
fications in themselves need not imply that the behavioral re-
sponses were underpinned by explicit reasoning about fact and
opinion beliefs. These alternative interpretations have important
implications for our view of young children’s epistemological
reasoning and deserve attention in future research.
Notwithstanding possible developmental continuities in justifi-
cations for behavior, as discussed above, we found clear age
differences in direct comments on the nature of matters of fact and
opinion. References to the validity of different subjective judg-
ments were used as justification for maintaining selections on
questions about matters of opinion only in the oldest age group.
Furthermore, the middle and oldest groups—but not the youngest
group—also offered such responses to the explicit questions about
the existence of wrong answers, especially when explaining why
there need not be a wrong answer on matters of opinion. Interest-
ingly, the oldest children were also more likely to indicate the basis
for objectivity in matters of fact by highlighting the fact that the
stimuli are different so that one of two different answers must be
wrong. In contrast, the youngest group did not show differentiation
in their responses to the explicit questions regarding matters of fact
and matters of opinion, even though their behavioral responses to
the experts’ judgments showed a clear differentiation between the
very same sets of fact and opinion matters.
Importantly, the patterns of results regarding the implicit mea-
sure (conforming to expert judgments) and the explicit measure
(saying that one of two different answers must be wrong) were
preserved even after controlling for each other. In line with this,
we found not only that many children never conformed to experts’
judgments about opinion questions despite explicitly asserting that
there are wrong answers to such questions, but also that some
children did on occasion conform to the experts’ opinions even
when they explicitly denied the possibility of wrong answers.
Thus, even though explicit understanding of the subjectivity of
opinions was in general less evident in this age range than implicit
awareness, we should not assume that the former develops solely
out of the latter.
General Discussion
The results from the two experiments presented here shed new
light on the epistemological development of children in primary
school. It seems clear that relying solely on measuring abstract,
metacognitive, verbal reflections on differing beliefs as right or
wrong or having degrees of rightness will not capture the implicit
awareness of the distinction between factual beliefs and opinions
that young children exhibit in their responses to others’ judgments.
In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds showed a clear tendency to
conform to peer responses on a question regarding ambiguous fact
substantially more than they did on a judgment about a matter of
opinion, even though they often could not explicitly reflect on the
subjectivity of differing opinions. In Experiment 2, a developmen-
tal increase in explicit understanding of the fact–opinion distinc-
tion was found to mask a stable ability, present from 6 years of
age, to differentiate between judgments about facts and judgments
about opinion: Even the youngest children in the sample were
more likely to change their judgment to match that of an expert
when the question at hand concerned a factual matter than when it
concerned a matter of aesthetic preference or taste.
These findings suggest that children are able to treat matters of
personal taste and aesthetic preference in a relativist/multiplist way
but at the same time view simple matters of fact in an absolutist
way, even if they cannot reflect on this distinction explicitly. The
results complement and add detail to the findings of Wainryb et al.
(2004) and Kuhn et al. (2000), demonstrating that relativist think-
ing is likely to be in place for some domains of belief fairly early
in primary school. Indeed, they add considerable credence to
Wainryb et al.’s (2004, p. 698) claim that “a generalized objectivist
position across domains of knowledge would . . . be highly un-
likely even among 5-year-olds.” However, it remains an important
task for future research to determine how children respond to
matters that are likely to involve both objective and subjective
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elements (e.g., complex factual questions about which children are
likely to have informed opinions).
Importantly, the results from the implicit measure used here
suggest that the relativism adopted by the children is selectively
applied to the domain of opinions, preferences, and tastes. Chil-
dren appear to deal with the ambiguity of some factual matters
while still grasping the essential objectivity of those matters, and
this evidence adds to our understanding of the working distinction
between facts and opinions held during middle childhood and
preadolescence (Chandler et al., 1990). The developmental pro-
cesses involved in this general pattern, however, clearly demand
further attention. Intriguing possibilities are suggested by the data
from our middle age group in Experiment 2. Whereas these 8- to
9-year-olds maintained their implicit differentiation of fact and
opinion judgments, their explicit responses indicated uncertainty
about both the subjectivity of subjective judgments and the objec-
tivity of objective judgments, with responses to both judgments no
different from chance levels. The existence of this wavering in
explicit knowledge about the domain generality of relativist think-
ing, alongside developmental stability in the children’s differenti-
ated responses to fact and opinion beliefs, raises critical questions
about the developmental link between implicit and explicit knowl-
edge. In particular, if explicit knowledge is a “redescription” of
implicit, procedural knowledge (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), then we
would expect explicit recognition of the subjectivity of opinions to
increase with age, but we would not expect any decrement in the
knowledge about objectivity (which is already in place—
explicitly—in the youngest group).
As noted earlier, Dienes and Perner’s (1999) discussion of
implicit and explicit knowledge presents evidence in favor of a
dissociation in competing knowledge bases (e.g., underlying non-
declarative and declarative false-belief understanding). Similarly,
there is evidence that preschoolers’ difficulties with explicit re-
flection on the sources of beliefs are dissociated from their more
sophisticated implicit evaluation of sources, as shown by differ-
entiated suggestibility to statements about an object’s identity from
a better informed versus less informed experimenter (Robinson &
Whitcombe, 2003). In the present context, we suggest that devel-
opmental changes in responses to our explicit questions need not
be conceived solely as a gradual increase in the ability to verbalize
what is already known implicitly. Children’s explicit responses at
different ages could indicate changing assumptions about when
“the truth” can be found (e.g., moving from an initial “always, for
all matters” to “maybe not, for any matter,” to “yes, but only for
matters of fact”). Critically, these assumptions may be dissociated
from the children’s implicit, procedural awareness of the distinc-
tion between factual judgments and opinions, which our studies
indicate is present in children as young as 6 years of age. Only in
the oldest age groups do the two coincide, such that 10-year-olds
can reflect explicitly on the subjectivity of opinions. As Wainryb
et al. (2004, p. 702) put it, “the developmental task faced by
children is to learn to recognize the features that distinguish among
different types of differences.” One possibility is that children’s
progress in this developmental task allows explicit knowledge to
catch up with—rather than be driven entirely by—the implicit
knowledge that they already demonstrate in their behavior.
Clearly, further work, utilizing more wide-ranging sets of judg-
ment tasks, must seek to clarify the nature of, and developmental
relations between, the implicit and explicit knowledge revealed in
our investigations.
It is important to stress that the differentiation between facts and
opinions in this study marks an early step in a long journey of
epistemological development for the children in our sample. Con-
siderable research documents the many changes in epistemological
beliefs that occur through the lifespan, which vary according to
context, experience, and domain (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn et
al., 2000), and future work must assess the links between these
changes and the understanding displayed by the children in this
study. First, the understanding of beliefs about ambiguous stimuli
clearly undergoes development during middle childhood (Beck &
Robinson, 2001; Carpendale & Chandler, 1996), and work has
suggested that explicit reasoning about the existence of “truth” and
the possibility of resolving disagreements over facts versus pref-
erences continues to mature into adolescence (Rowley & Robin-
son, in press). Even in the reasoning of adults, normative consid-
erations may sometimes be found to outweigh the importance of
idiosyncratic preferences (Meerum Terwogt & Rieffe, 2003). Our
findings of developmental changes in explicit reasoning about
objective and subjective judgments are consistent with this evi-
dence, yet further work is needed to elucidate the underlying
processes (which may include broader cognitive developmental
patterns as well as issues connected with identity; Chandler et al.,
1990) responsible for these pathways.
Second, the understanding that some matters are dependent on
subjective preferences that are neither right nor wrong represents
only one progression of several in the understanding of subjectiv-
ity. As Kuhn et al. (2000) demonstrate, relativist positions them-
selves can be overtaken by evaluativist approaches that integrate
objective and subjective dimensions. We noted earlier that our
beliefs about many “facts” may sometimes be influenced by per-
sonal preference and that the opinions we hold may sometimes
relate to objective characteristics. For example, two different opin-
ions can both be seen as legitimate and “right,” but their merits can
be weighed on the basis of evidence and other external criteria.
Indeed, Robinson and Apperly (1998) presented evidence that
adolescents are different from adults in their failure to see such an
objective dimension as a basis for resolving scientific disputes.
Importantly, the present results raise the possibility of a dissocia-
tion between individuals’ metacognitive reflections on different
types of dispute and the implicit epistemological beliefs they may
exhibit in their behavior when personally responding to such
disputes themselves. Thus, the challenge facing researchers is both
to track the development of epistemological beliefs through child-
hood, adolescence, and beyond at both explicit and implicit levels,
and then to determine how the individuals’ explicit reasoning
about different beliefs is connected to the behavioral indicators of
their implicit epistemologies.
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Appendix
Tasks and Questions in Experiment 2
Sample Judgment Task in Experiment 2
1. Present photographs of three desserts (labeled A, B, and C).
a. Opinion task: Which one is the most tasty? Fact task: Which
one takes the longest to bake?
b. How sure are you about your answer? (not sure at all, a bit
sure, quite sure, very sure)
c. We asked this question to Peter, who is a baker and spends
a lot of time making different kinds of puddings. He said . . .
You had said . . . Do you want to change your answer now
or do you still think . . .?
d. How sure are you about this answer? (not sure at all, a bit
sure, quite sure, very sure)
e. Why did your answer change/stay the same?
f. Imagine if Tom said X and John said Y. Would one of them
have to be wrong? Why or why not?
Content of Other Judgment Tasks in Experiment 2
1. Three houses: Which one is the nicest? (opinion) or Which one
is the most expensive? (fact); expert judgment provided by
estate agent.
2. Three dogs: Which one is the friendliest? (opinion) or Which
one is the oldest? (fact); expert judgment provided by vet.
3. Three toys: Which one would be the most fun to play with?
(opinion) or Which one is bought by the most people? (fact);
expert judgment provided by owner of toy shops.
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